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Thank you, Cynthia, for the opportunity to be on this very
distinguished panel. I am presenting a view from the private sector of the
proposals discussed by my colleagues. However, I should make clear from
the outset that these are my own views and do not necessarily represent the
views of Deutsche Bank or the Institute of International Finance.
These are interesting times. The capital markets are going through a
phase of enormous disruption as a direct result of the financial crises in
Asia and Russia. Net private capital flows to emerging markets have
plummeted from a peak of $300 billion in 1996 to a projected $160 billion
in 1998. The fundamental question before policy makers today is how best
to respond to Asian/Russian style crises, maintaining both confidence and
discipline in the market? The debate of who, if anyone, should have
jurisdiction over capital flows has renewed in this context.
It is interesting that the issue is now framed as a question of whether
an international entity (usually the IMF) should have the ability to assist or
sanction a country's imposition of capital controls. Prior to the Asian crisis
there seemed to be broad consensus that the elimination of capital controls
in emerging market economies would be generally desirable. As recently
as 1997, proponents of expanding the IMF's jurisdiction over capital flows
argued it was necessary to promote liberalization of such flows. The Asia
crisis has made it abundantly clear that even the best and brightest are still
learning about the workings of the modern financial markets, a task not
made easier by the rapid pace of change. We are now reconsidering our
positions on whether such controls have a place in today's economic world;
the debate is now when, and what type of capital controls are appropriate.
Without question, the issue is important. Private capital flows have
been a major part of the engine for growth in emerging markets in the
1990's, replacing much of the financing formerly provided by official
sources. Much of the flows have been to the private, rather than sovereign
sector. A large component has continued to be in the form of portfolio
(often short-term) investment, despite the concerns raised about this type of
investment's volatility after the Mexican peso crisis of 1994 through 1995.
Derivatives, particularly deliverable and non-deliverable currency
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forwards, have also become an important part of the equation. A very large
and active secondary market developed both for bank debt and for
securities. Technology has dramatically increased the speed with which
these funds can be transferred out of a country perceived as troubled.
These changes, as you have heard, have given rise to a view in some
circles that the old systems no longer work - that a new financial
architecture is needed to promote resolution of crises. Feelings have been
expressed that the private investors and lenders have not borne their fair
share of the burden in debt restructurings, and that rapid uncontrolled
capital flows have had a destabilizing influence on attempts to resolve
recent crises. Certain officials, including Michel Caindessus, Managing
Director of the IMF, have argued that the IMF needs authority over capital
flows to provide a basis for moratoria, standstills and similar arrangements
involving an element of involuntary deferral of performance of financial
contracts. In this context, the G-7 statements call for greater private sector
participation in resolution of debt crises, strengthening of the IMF and
expansion of the IMF's policy of lending into arrears.
What exactly is meant by the G-7 statements is unclear. But the
international financial community is concerned that certain proposals made
after the 1994 through 1995 Mexican peso crisis may be resurfacing. A
recurring theme is that an international organization or agency should have
powers similar to a U.S. bankruptcy court. The IMF continues to be
frequently mentioned as a potential repository of such powers.
Government officials, in recent pronouncements, have referred to giving
the IMF explicit power to impose a standstill. Expansion of the IMF's
jurisdiction over capital flows - in particular expansion of the scope of
Article VIII 2(b) to clarify that any contract in contravention of IMF
approved capital controls will not be enforceable in member courts - has
also been suggested as a means to achieve this result. Implicit in the
proposals is the proposition that such a standstill or capital controls will
have retroactive effect - i.e., that contracts in compliance with exchange
controls at the time they were entered into will not be enforceable if IMF-
imposed or -approved controls are subsequently adopted.
Given these recent proposals, my remarks tonight will focus upon the
issues presented by expanding the IMF's jurisdiction over capital flows to
more explicitly empower the IMF to implement or support a country in
implementing stays, moratoria and other involuntary deferrals of
performance of financial contracts. However, it should be stressed that
vesting any other international organization with similar authority would
raise many of the same issues (and perhaps even more so).
It should be noted that the IMF, in practice, has considerable influence
over member countries' decisions to eliminate or impose capital controls.
Perhaps most importantly, the IMF has significant leverage when a country
seeks IMF support. Outside of a crisis, it also has influence over
members' economic and financial policies in exercise of its powers of
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surveillance. It has also indirectly supported country decisions to defer
payment to banks by lending into arrears.
The perceived need to further expand IMF powers is based upon the
changed structure of the market. In particular, there is a view that an
international entity needs to have the authority to take quick action in a
crisis to stop the bleeding and give the country breathing room. While
banks in the 1980's generally observed effective standstills so long as good
faith negotiations were taking place, concern exists that today's widely
dispersed holders of debt may not have the same incentives - whether
arising from relationships, contractual terms such as sharing clauses or
political pressures - to participate in an organized debt restructuring.
Consequently, the risk of the creditors attempting to seize assets, or of a
rogue creditor, using strike suits and other means to hold a restructuring
hostage to receive more than its fair share, is perceived to be greater. As
mentioned above, many also believe that a mechanism should be in place to
facilitate debt reduction instead of merely a stretch-out of existing principal
and interest.
Not surprisingly, the private sector reaction to expanding IMF powers
along these lines is one of nervousness. Such proposals give rise to fears
that international respect for private contracts is being undermined and,
particularly, those decisions as to enforceability of creditors rights will be
made i) in fora where the creditors have a limited, if any, voice; and ii) by
entities with conflicting interests and objectives. Giving an international
entity explicit power to impose a standstill (unsettling enough to many
lenders, particularly since it is unclear how long such a standstill will last)
raises the specter that this power will lead to the next step, to the ability to
effectively impose cram-down, or reduction of debt. The result is greater
anxiety about returning to emerging markets at the very time that the
official and private financial communities seek to rebuild confidence.
Whispers about the use of other peoples' money to achieve international
political objectives can be heard.
Proponents of giving the IMF or another international entity power to
impose a standstill or otherwise modify creditor rights through imposition
or sanctioning of capital controls draw an analogy to the United States
bankruptcy system. They rightly point out that creditors continue to lend
to United States companies even though creditors know that their rights
may be compromised in a bankruptcy proceeding. However, there are
fundamental issues presented in attempting to translate such concept into
the international arena.
From the outset in the United States, there is a question, never fully
resolved, as to whether the nullification or modification of United States
contract rights as a result of an international treaty or IMF edict -
particularly if ex post facto - could be challenged as an unconstitutional
taking of property. United States bankruptcy law has its foundation in the
United States Constitution. Even with this authority, bankruptcy
proceedings attempt to strike a balance between property rights and the
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objectives to be achieved through the bankruptcy law. For example, stays
are lifted if the court determines that the stay is unnecessary or that
creditors are not being adequately protected. It also should be noted that
the United States philosophies regarding debt relief underpinning Chapter
11 are not yet broadly accepted in other countries. Whether impediments
will exist to according the IMF such powers under the laws of other
jurisdictions is yet to be determined. Accordingly, there may be legal
issues presented under United States and other laws by any attempt to grant
the IMF bankruptcy-like powers. However, for today, we will put these
interesting questions aside and focus upon the merits of these proposals.
The United States bankruptcy procedure generally involves a -forum
widely perceived to be impartial, focused largely upon maximizing the
value of the estate for the creditors. Creditors participate in development of
a plan, which is worked out between the debtor and representatives of the
creditor groups (indeed, some commentators have referred to the role of
the bankruptcy judge more as a referee than a decision maker). A party to
the contracts, i.e., a significant creditor or the debtor, must initiate the
proceeding. And, even in the United States, a bankruptcy filing is not a
step lightly taken. The owners and management of the debtor are at risk of
losing their equity and their jobs. Creditors fear losing control of the
process.
Furthermore, in the context of private sector proceedings, stays are
not imposed on a country-wide or industry-wide basis, but rather in the
context of each individual debtor. As noted above, there is a balancing of
the creditors' property rights and debtor relief objectives; exceptions to
stays are accordingly granted taking into account the individual
circumstances.
It will be very difficult for the IMF to provide a forum that creditors
will view as impartial. The IMF is, by its nature, political. Its objectives,
quite rightly, are not to maximize the debtor's estate for the benefit of
private creditors. And, given that the IMF and its major shareholders are
lenders themselves, the IMF has a conflict of interest not easily susceptible
to remedy. It is likely to have a policy agenda that may preclude it from
acting predominately as a referee, letting the debtors and creditors work
things out as they see fit. It may even be the party directing the country to
institute the proceedings. In this regard, it should be noted that neither the
IMF nor the country will have the same disincentives as in a United States
style bankruptcy to institute a stay or other proceeding - in fact, there may
be incentives to take such action. * Arguably in the case of the existing
government, imposition of a stay would even strengthen its position; the
IMF cannot be expected to have a bankruptcy court's power to force
changes in management of the sovereign debtor. To the extent private
sector debt is involved, the stay would shield debtor companies and their
existing management from the consequences of their actions; furthermore,
to the extent that they are doing business outside of their home jurisdiction,
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such companies would have protection not afforded to their competitors in
such other jurisdictions.
As a result, accountability and pressure for reform will be further
reduced. Creditors will be effectively defanged to the extent their contract
rights become unenforceable. They will retain little or no leverage to force
a recalcitrant country or company to the negotiating table (other than a
refusal to lend further money). Furthermore, in the private context, the
international stays would most likely be imposed across the board There
would be no consideration of the merits of individual cases, industries or
companies or, if there were to be, the decisions would most likely be made
by either the IMF or the country affected (with the
endorsement/encouragement of the IMF). In short, the IMF would wield a
very powerful, but blunt instrument. Creditors would have little, if any,
input or control.
Many major private sector participants consequently are not convinced
that expanding the IMF's jurisdiction over capital flows to give it enhanced
power to impose or support standstills or moratoria is either necessary or
desirable at this time. Historically, at times of crises, stays effectively
have been implemented through creditor cooperation with a country.
Litigation has not been a major factor where the country has been
negotiating in good faith. Whether litigation becomes more of a problem
in today's environment remains to be seen. However, there are still factors
(in addition to expense and time) which discourage creditors from engaging
in an unseemly rush to the courthouse.
Generally, sovereign debtors have few assets outside of their home
country that can be relied upon. This is often true of private debtors as
well. There are special defenses to suit or attachment that must be
overcome, based upon sovereign immunity, act of state, and comity.
Courts can be hostile to a creditor that they do not believe is acting in good
faith and with commercial reasonableness. In a recent decision, Elliott
Associates, L.P. v. the Republic of Peru, the Southern District of New
York refused to enforce a claim against Peru invoking the medieval defense
of champerty, providing a warning to those who buy claims strictly for the
purpose of bringing strike suits. Countries have long memories of those
who take legal action against them. Among other things, financial
institutions who sue may find themselves locked out of lucrative business
opportunities for many years to come.
Leading creditors who have negotiated debt restructuring packages in
the context of the London Club have never had the authority to bind those
not at the table. As a result, they have been extremely cognizant of
negotiating a package that other creditors would be willing to accept -
ensuring at least some level of fairness. Bondholders, protection councils,
and similar groups have performed similar functions for securities holders
in the past. The secondary market also, frankly, creates certain
opportunities for sovereign and other debtors. Although certainly not
endorsed by the international financial community, debt reduction has been
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achieved by some countries, most notably Peru and Nigeria, who have
arranged for buy-backs of their debt in the open markets after it began
trading at a deep discount. Where perceived as necessary, moratoria have
also been imposed by governments, albeit at a steep price in later ability to
access capital markets. Although this has unsettled markets, this may not
be a bad thing - particularly if markets can learn to differentiate among
different debtors. It is not a step taken lightly.
Even using the United States model for a stay in bankruptcy does not
achieve all, perhaps, desired. One question is how long should the
standstill last? Debt restructurings have taken as much as 14 years to
conclude. What happens when the standstill is taken off? If the country's
fundamentals have not improved, the capital outflow situation may be even
worse than before. Also, what should be done with derivatives? United
States law exempts many such contracts from the automatic stay,
recognizing that time is of the essence in these transactions due both to
their nature and the intricate network of hedges institutions use.
A brief mention of lending into arrears. Statements have been made
implying that this may be the way to indirectly give the IMF power to
sanction a deferral of payment to creditors and even a reduction in debt.
To the extent that this is the case, it presents the problems discussed above
and consequently risks further unsettling the markets rather than building
confidence. Any decision to expand the IMF's policy in this regard should
be carefully evaluated for its potential impact on the markets.
The private sector recognizes that the current situation is not perfect.
When we look at the system today and the mechanisms available for risk
management, we can see that the markets do look different than the 1970s -
but many of the changes are positive. The markets are more liquid, more
diversified, more open. New methods of quantifying and managing risk
have been developed in response to these changes and it can be expected
that, as the markets continue to change and new problems arise, there will
be further development.
This evolution is taking place in the context of the issues discussed
today. Private sector groups such as The Institute of International Finance
are actively promoting practical, private-sector based, approaches to debt
crises, including greater public-private sector dialogue and cooperation.
For example, private circles are currently debating whether introduction of
contractual provisions to facilitate private debt restructurings (such as
collective representation clauses) would be desirable. Plans, such as the
Jakarta Initiative, are being developed and implemented to promote
organized out of court workouts of troubled private sector companies.
Steps are being taken to strengthen local bankruptcy systems, and
international protocols and concordats for recognition of foreign
bankruptcy proceedings (including court-imposed stays) are being
developed, to provide relief in the case of private sector companies. The
IMF and the world financial system may well be better served by the IMF
supporting these measures rather than trying to substitute for them.
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The desire for a more orderly and theoretically tidy process is
understandable. However, the temptation to resort to a quick fix,
especially with respect to complex and dynamic markets, should be
resisted. Some humility may be appropriate when we think that, only in
1997, the desired objective was to promote the elimination of capital
controls in emerging markets. Before implementing radical solutions, we
should proceed cautiously and ask hard questions about their overall impact
on private capital flows creatures that have proved to be extremely fickle
over the last year.
